Claremont Colleges

Scholarship @ Claremont
Scripps Senior Theses

Scripps Student Scholarship

2015

Interior, Concept and Clay: A Study of Self and
Space
Lily Alan
Scripps College

Recommended Citation
Alan, Lily, "Interior, Concept and Clay: A Study of Self and Space" (2015). Scripps Senior Theses. Paper 563.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/563

This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Scripps Student Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Scripps Senior Theses by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact
scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

INTERIOR, CONCEPT & CLAY: A STUDY OF SELF AND SPACE

by
Lily Alan

SUMBITTED TO SCRIPPS COLLEGE IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS

Professor Susan Rankaitis
Professor Julia Haft-Candell

DECEMBER 12, 2014

Acknowledgements
Thank you to my professors and readers who always asked the right questions. To
my friends and family who supported me in my creative and intellectual
endeavors. And to ceramic clay, my unrequited love.

What is the modern conception of pure art? It is to create a suggestive magic
which contains both subject and object, the external world and the artist himself.
— Charles Baudelaire, L’Art Philosophique

The topics of space and the self are temptations for ontologists and epistemologists alike.
The vague and seemingly ineffable natures of these concepts are irresistible to these progressive
scholars who examine the nature of being and theories of knowledge, respectively.
Consequentially, there is an extraordinary amount of texts and theories concerning these enticing
subjects. Rather than chronologically, I have organized these theories by specificity or by a
denotation of scale, if you will. After each discussed theory I will examine the way in which they
directly influenced my artistic investigation of space and the self within my senior thesis project:
Interior, Concept & Clay.
This ceramic installation was originally prompted by the word “interiority” and its ability
to describe both an interior space and the interior self. The piece encourages viewers to place
their heads within the sculpture and look out through carved peepholes. This act of looking out
captures the overlap between the physical and the metaphysical. It creates a moment where
interior space and the interior self interact in multiple, complex dimensions: enjoyment, anxiety,
compromise, and reflection. By looking out through an enclosed space with peripheral vision
obstructed, viewers are reminded of their own specificity as well as the spaces within their minds
and sense of self.
We begin our journey within the human brain and the study of visual, perceptual experience.
Nivedita Gangopadhyay, Michael Madary, and Finn Spicer’s book Perception, Action, and
Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Two Visual Systems explores the cognitive
connection between perception and action as well as the body and consciousness. The authors
state their motivation as the “new paradigm [of perceptual experience that] encourages a radical

rethinking of the nature of perceptual states and the subject of experience” (Gangopadhyay et al.
1). One of the particularly poignant issues worth rethinking is the dual-visual system, also known
as the two-streams hypothesis.
One of the earliest discussions of the dual-visual system was proposed by brain development
specialist Colwyn Trevarthen in 1968 (Gangopadhyay et al. 2). Trevarthen presented the notion
that the two subsets of vision within monkeys: ‘vision of space’ and ‘vision of object identity’
are “subserved by anatomically distinct brain mechanisms” (Gangopadhyay et al. 2). One year
later, neuroscientist Gerald E. Schneider described the theory in its application within the human
brain (Gangopadhyay et al. 2). In more recent times, M.A. Goodale and A.D. Milner claimed that
the previously theorized dual-visual system occurs at the point where visual information leaves
the occipital lobe and splits off into two-streams. First, the dorsal stream, whose purpose is to
process an object’s spatial location in regard to the perceiver, travels to the parietal lobe. Second,
the ventral system, which is involved in object identification, travels to the temporal lobe
(Gangopadhyay et al. 2). What Trevarthen called “vision of space” in the dorsal stream and
“vision of object identity” in the ventral stream, Goodale and Milner describe as “vision for
action” and “vision for perception,” respectively (Gangopadhyay et al. 2).
While there are criticisms of the proposed differentiated and separate functions of the two
streams, this work is important as it established an emphasis on visual output and behavior, as
opposed to a focus on visual input distinctions. This distinction connects to the idea of space as it
defines the concept as a potential for visual perception and action. It relates to the self as it
tangentially plays with the idea of visual specificity within the mind’s interior. Further, if we
align the definition of the self with notions of individualistic perception, the two-streams
hypothesis explores the self directly as it characterizes vision as a distinctive attribute. Questions

of visual perception in relation to action, like the theories mentioned, push the boundaries of
what vision means and makes a crucial point in the analysis of how the human self interacts
within space.
This investigation of a dual-visual system is critical to Interior, Concept & Clay as it aims to
give each viewer an altered sense of vision. Once inside the sculpture, the ceramic piece
obstructs the viewer’s peripheral vision and changes his or her “vision of space” within the
surrounding area as well as within the sculpture. Additionally, the artwork alters one’s “vision of
object identity.” A person outside of the sculpture becomes merely a face or arm while a chair
becomes a wooden leg or a swatch of fabric. While this obstruction would typically be
interpreted as a hindrance Interior, Concept & Clay challenges others to view it as an alternative.
Gaining a more atomistic, specific view of an environment allows one to notice details and
possess a new perspective on seemingly ordinary things.
Thinking of vision as a combination of elements and variables rather than one entity allows
one to understand its complexity as well as experiment with it. Behind the formal structures of
art and design—specifically shape, form, and value—lies a scientific background that, when
explored, addresses concerns, opens up new and important questions, and can even inspire new
ideas.
Another influential thinker that considers these important questions within scientific and
mathematical fields is architectural historian and theorist, Peg Rawes. In her 2008 book Space,
Geometry and Aesthetics: Through Kant and Towards Deluze (Renewing Philosophy), Rawes
examines aesthetic geometry and space through the lens of ontological philosophy.
Demonstrated across her citations, Rawes conveys the idea that spatial figures and geometric
methods are imbued with an aesthetic sensibility unlocked when placed within the context of

physical corporeality. For example, she writes, “geometry is not merely a mathematical method
of constructing space but is also an aesthetic and embodied procedure, thereby challenging the
view that geometry is exclusively concerned with scientific forms of knowledge” (Rawes 4).
Here Rawes describes geometry in the borrowed words of Goodale and Milner, as possessing a
potential for action and perception. The word “geometry” is derived from the Latin word
geometria—meaning the science of measuring and the Hellenistic Greek word γεωµετρία—
meaning land survey (OED Online). That is to say that geometry has deep roots in spatial
understanding. To bring in a discussion of the human sense of perception, Rawes turns to
legendary thinker and German philosopher Immanuel Kant.
The work of Kant is particularly fitting for Rawes’ conversation as his work “explores
how spatial three-dimensionality is derived from our sensible understanding of other bodies in
relation to our own corporeality” (Rawes 17-8). Indeed, Kant writes of this matter thoroughly in
his theoretical philosophy within the years 1755-1770. He claims that humans only have a
cognitive comprehension of the things that exist outside oneself insofar as they stand within
relation to one’s own anatomy (Kant 366). Aligned with this thinking, it makes sense that the
intersecting planes that make up the three dimensions of Cartesian space derive from the relation
they have to our bodies (Kant 366). This concept is crucial as it clearly connects space to human
perception, and even goes on to suggest that space is a result of one’s own individualistic
perception.
Kant chooses to exemplify this relation through the example of drawing out spatial
figures. He “discusses how the imagination is the active aesthetics generator of geometry and
space because it is analogous to the ‘technical’ tools that construct geometric figures (e.g., the
compass and ruler)” (Rawes 3). In this regard, the mind is a device for projection, assessment,

and calculation. Does this mean that the spatial field is akin to the sphere of consciousness, or
even the self? The answer is indefinite but, then again, so is the question.
Both the question and its answer significantly influenced Interior, Concept & Clay as it
brings forward a pivotal link between space and the self. It is this link that my ceramic
installation works to investigate and emulate. Rawes’ and Kant’s idea that geometric figures are
imbued with spatial and aesthetic value also plays an influential role in the installation as the
pieces, themselves, are geometric forms that, as artworks, take on aesthetic and spatial
dimensions. Further, Kant’s suggestion that one’s definition of space is a product of one’s own
perception captures one of the most important topics of my artwork: each sighted person has an
individualistic sense of perception that can be linked to one’s self. It is this sense of self that
helps inform the recognition and comprehension of space. Or, in other words, the way we
perceive ourselves influences the way we perceive that which surrounds us.
Gaston Bachelard, French philosopher, grapples with some of the same ideas as Kant in
his 1958 text: The Poetics of Space as he lays the spatial world of the house alongside the
metaphysical world of the mind. Bachelard introduces this significant connection early on. He
writes: “For our house is our corner of the world. As has often been said, it is our first universe, a
real cosmos in every sense of the word” (Bachelard 4). As Bachelard equates the house to the
cosmos he greatly emphasizes the importance of the home to its inhabitant, the weight it carries
in our lives, and the all-encompassing nature it seems to possess. It is important to closely read
the phrase “in every sense of the word.” While we have taken the cosmos to mean the
magnificent and vast universe, we must acknowledge “cosmos” in all of its senses. One of its
other crucial senses can be traced through its etymological basis in a Greek word meaning order

(OED Online). So, of course, the cosmos is as notable for its order and harmony as it is for its
sheer splendorous size.
So how does this sense of order relate to the house? According to Bachelard, the house is
the ordered system that holds and protects our dreams—in both day and night (Bachelard 6). The
house retains “the treasures of former days” and its protection shelters our memories of
“Motionless Childhood, motionless the way all immemorial things are” (Bachelard 5). These
memories are static, yet one can remember them as time passes. Thus, they are not frozen in time
but rather in space. Bachelard elucidates this point as he writes: “Memories are motionless, and
the more securely they are fixed in space, the sounder they are… For a knowledge of intimacy,
localization in the spaces of our intimacy is more urgent than determination of dates” (Bachelard
9). If we take Bachelard’s word—that intimate moments are safer in space than in time—then
one begins to wonder what else can be uncovered within the spaces of our memories.
Bachelard, too, pondered this same thought; his self-conceived response was
topoanalysis, which he defines as: “the systematic psychological study of the sites in our intimate
lives” (Bachelard 8). The sites from one’s past that house and protect intimate moments color the
way one views space in real time. The corners, windows, and hallways of one’s childhood
memories are ever present in each corner, window, and hallway one sees. These spaces remain
within us as ghosts only to reveal themselves as faint memories. Sometimes their presence is so
distant insofar as they are not conscious memories, only a vague yet comforting familiarity.
Bachelard particularly notes one’s interactions within spaces of previous solitude that he details
as: “the spaces in which we have suffered from solitude, enjoyed, desired and compromised
solitude [that] remain indelible within us” (Bachelard 10). He equates the value of these spaces
of solitude to that of a shell: a retreat for privacy and shelter (Bachelard 10). The motif of the

shell is also a signal of emptiness and withdrawal. In this regard, the shell embodies all aspects
of solitude; its enjoyment and its suffering. Empty spaces are not always inviting and they can
make viewers or inhabitants feel self-conscious, scared, or nervous. Still, there are moments
where one can find peace, clarity, and positive reflection in solitude.
So what are the aspects that differentiate peaceful spaces of solitude from unnerving
ones? It is both, as Bachelard suggested, one’s previous memories of similar spaces along with
the physical attributes of the space. For example, a room with many corners and sharp edges
would discourage creative and positive moments of solitude more than a rounded, smooth one.
This, according to Bachelard is because “everything round invites a caress” (236). The visual and
tactile sensation of roundness, while somewhat disorienting, gives an impression of a cradled
enclosure that further supports the enjoyment of solitude.
This idea along with many other ideas expressed by Bachelard played a role in the
conception of Interior, Concept & Clay. The topic of solitude is directly addressed by the
physical enclosure or rounded “shell” that creates a space of isolation. Additionally, the piece
creates a sense of emotional and mental solitude. Looking out on an open environment through
an enclosed space fosters a sense of solitude in a less concrete way; this solitude can be
experienced, as Bachelard suggested, as something complex, enjoyable, compromised, anxious,
and desirable. The artwork aims to allow viewers to explore this solitude in their own terms
without guiding them toward an anticipated response. One could determine that the ceramic
sculptures also encompass Bachelard’s idea that intimate moments are safer in space than in
time. Viewers will be able to recall the “intimate” moment of solitude they experienced within
my piece. Rather than a connection between the experience with a date or time, the moment is
bound to a specific space and a specific experience of the self. This moment of solitude is largely

based in a notion of self-awareness and the self, topics that have been redefined, debated, and
criticized for centuries.
The word “self” has numerous meanings. It is defined as a pronoun, adjective, noun and
prefix. Needless to say, it has a long and complex history. Looking specifically through the lens
of self-awareness within philosophy, we begin with the two ends of the spectrum: the birth of the
self and the enlightenment of no-self. In his book Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden
Braid, Pulitzer Prize winning cognitive scientist Douglas Hofstadter expresses his belief that the
self is not inborn but, rather, “comes into being at the moment is has the power to reflect itself”
(Canfield 171). In other words, the dawning of self-awareness is the birth of the self (Canfield
171). Opposing, Satori is a Zen Buddhist term used to describe the experience of enlightenment
in which one realizes that there is no self (Canfield 171). Ranging between these contrasting and
extreme views are slightly more moderate takes on the self and its meaning.
For example, 18th century philosopher David Hume is cited as stating that the self is an
illusion (Canfield 1). However, he did acknowledge the existence of the “I” as a synthesis of
one’s perception (Canfield 1). This perspective clearly separates the “I” from the self and, in
turn, places the notion of the self, of which Hume denied, on a level beyond mere perception to
something metaphysical and transcendent. Somewhat similarly, 18th century scientist Georg
Lichtenberg and 19th century philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche both referred to the self as a sort of
“grammatical illusion” (Canfield 2). That is to imply that “I” is a “substantive word lacking a
substance to denote” (Canfield 2). This idea shrouds the self in further mystery; is it a mistake or
a puzzle to be solved?
One theory that attempts to resolve the mystery is solipsism. The philosophical ideology
of solipsism is “a denial of a common or public world. It holds that the sphere of consciousness

of each person is (for that person) the total world” (Canfield 15). Therefore, in order to define
solipsism under its own guidelines, one must say it in the first person: “I and the things that I
immediately experience and only those things, constitute the entire universe; there is nothing
beyond them” (Canfield 15). This theory immediately sounds unreasonable and naïve. How can
someone seriously consider “the world revolves around me” as a philosophical ideology worth
exploring? However, with further analysis, the basis for its foundation finds legitimacy.
It is known that the “science of perception establishes a time gap between initial
stimulation and direct experience” (Canfield 15). As a result, we do not directly interact with the
physical world. Instead, we interact with our own subjective perception of reality (Canfield 15).
Consequentially, the world one sees and experiences is an extension of oneself. The next natural
step is to wonder whether there is a reality “behind those immediate experiences” (Canfield 15).
Suddenly the notion of solipsism does not seem so nonsensical. So, what is the self in accordance
with solipsism? One could gather that it is everything and nothing all at once. It is everything as
one’s sphere of consciousness is akin to the entire universe. But, if we take the self to mean a
person’s essential being that distinguishes them from others, then the solipsistic self is nonexistent as there is no other self to distinguish from. Now we can begin to see the paradoxical
inner nature of the self. Stripped of all its glory and splendor we discover a term that is
constantly battling its own connotations.
The next question to ask is: how can a topic so connected and intertwined with the human
experience vary so immensely? Throughout human existence, the self has been defined as an
illusion, a transcendence of reality, an enigma, everything, and nothing. If its existence is
fictitious, the self must be mistaken for something else because the concept, whether it is refuted
or accepted, is so widespread (Canfield 173). Perhaps the resolution to the problem can be found

within its examples. The two-streams hypothesis highlights individualistic perceptions within the
brain and the self, Kant and Rawes examine the connection between specific spatial fields and its
corresponding sphere of consciousness. Bachelard delves deeper into the sphere of consciousness
as he studies memories and their manifestations within interiors and Canfield questions the
power of these connections through the specific yet multidimensional self. Meanwhile, my own
piece Interior, Concept & Clay aims to give viewers a chance to interact with the relationship
between their perception of space and the self. The common thread that binds all of these
examples together is the predominance of difference, specificity, and individualistic perceptions.
We, as humans, are all different. We experience different things in different ways and
processes. Whether it is related to space or the self, these differences result in varying beliefs on
what these topics mean to ourselves and to those around us. In this regard, the answer is the
question. It is, quite ironically, self-referential. There are multiple definitions of the self and its
interaction in space because there are multiple definitions. Each definition, each person,
generates a specific experience that cycles back and reaffirms or redefines the definition. Does
this matter? Probably. But what matters most in human terms is that regardless of what one’s
outer-self reality may be, it, in the words of Baudelaire, “helps me to feel that I am what I am”
(Canfield 172). It is important to remember that supporting the words that string together each
philosophy is a person who believes, through their perspective and experience, that his or her
theory holds true. Rather than agree or refute it, we should merely admire its existence as a relic
of the human experience. With this statement comes a revelation: we cannot find the self within
these differences as it is made up of the spaces in between. My thesis piece champions this idea
as it creates a space in between the differences for exploration and safekeeping.
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